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Since the 1970s,  the system of mortgage financing in 
the United States has undergone tremendous change. 
The  elimination of ceilings on interest rates payable on 
time deposits and of state-imposed usury ceilings  on 
interest rates chargeable  on mortgages has ended 
bouts of mortgage rationing. Accompanying this proc- 
ess of deregulation has been a surge in financial inno- 
vation. The widespread issuance of the adjustable rate 
mortgage as an alternative to the fixed rate mortgage 
in the 1980s has helped thrifts and some other mort- 
gage lenders better manage their exposure to varying 
interest rates. Also over the last decade, the mortgage- 
backed securities market has grown to become one of 
the largest fixed-income markets in the United States, 
increasing the integration of the mortgage market with 
other  capital markets. 
In transforming the system of mortgage finance, 
deregulation and financial innovation have altered the 
way monetary policy influences the cost and availability 
of mortgages and, ultimately, residential investment. In 
the past, one of the powerful channels through which 
monetary policy affected economic activity was mort- 
gage rationing. Whenever a tightening in monetary p01- 
icy pushed market interest rates above the interest rate 
ceilings on time deposits,  banks and thrifts experi- 
enced an outflow of retail funds that forced  these insti- 
tutions to restrict new credit. Now, however, credit 
rationing  in the mortgage market resulting  from the 
interaction of market interest rates and these ceilings 
has been eliminated. Consequently,  movements  in 
interest rates play a more direct role in allocating funds 
to mortgage lending. 
This article investigates the extent to which dereg- 
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ulation and innovation have changed the responsive- 
ness of housing investment to monetary policy shifts. It 
gives particular attention to the effects of changes in 
the federal funds rate, one indicator of the relative 
ease or restraint of monetary policy. The article con- 
cludes that housing investment has become much less 
sensitive to a rise in the federal funds rate and attrib- 
utes this development  largely to the elimination of 
deposit rate ceilings. Although other financial  innova- 
tions have had important effects on the system of 
housing finance, little evidence is found that they have 
had a significant effect on the way residential invest- 
ment responds to monetary policy. 
The first section of the article  reviews the elimination 
of interest rate ceilings on  both deposits and mort- 
gages, the introduction of adjustable rate mortgages, 
the growth  of securitization of mortgages,  and the 
increase in competition between the thrifts and other 
mortgage lenders.  Empirical  evidence  on the deter- 
mination of mortgage interest rates and housing invest- 
ment is then explored, and asmall statistical model of 
residential investment and  mortgage interest rates is 
presented to examine the changing sensitivity of hous- 
ing investment to variations  in  interest rates. A con- 
cluding section  summarizes the main analytical  and 
empirical results of the article. 
Innovation in and deregulation of housing finance 
Interest rate  ceilings 
Interest rate ceilings of one form or another  played 
important roles in the allocation of funds between the 
mortgage and other  financial markets prior to deregula- 
tion in the early 1980s. The Federal Reserve's Regula- tion 0, which had restricted the maximum interest rates 
that banks could pay on time deposits since 1933, was 
extended to thrifts in September 1966 during a period 
of  sharply rising short-term interest rates. Furthermore, 
many states over time passed usury laws that con- 
trolled, among other  things, the maximum interest rate 
that lenders could charge on mortgages.1 
Whenever  interest rates on short-term market instru- 
ments such as Treasury bills rose significantly above 
the Regulation Q ceilings (Chart 1), there was a sharp 
outflow of funds from depository institutions as cus- 
tomers withdrew savings to invest  in higher yielding 
instruments. This diversion of funds, or "deposit  dis- 
intermediation,"  created a funding  problem for both 
banks and thrifts. It was particularly severe for the lat- 
ter group of institutions because of their limited access 
to alternative sources of funds. During these periods, 
often referred to as "credit crunches," depository insti- 
tutions were forced to reduce mortgage lending sharply 
(Chart 2). 
INew York, for  example, in 1980  still had an 8'/2 percent ceiling on the 
rate that could be charged on mortgage lending. 
Chart  1 
Nevertheless, the interaction of deposit ceilings and 
high market interest rates stimulated financial innova- 
tion that may in fact have reduced the ability of these 
ceilings to restrain mortgage lending during periods of 
monetary tightening.  Market interest  rates remained 
above rates that thrifts and banks could offer on retail 
deposits for significant  periods  of time,  producing a 
growing unsatisfied demand for mortgages at market 
interest rates then prevailing. This unsatisfied demand 
in turn encouraged the development of other sources 
of funding (such as wholesale funding markets  or secu- 
ritization of mortgage assets) and may have induced 
other  financial institutions, not subject to these ceilings, 
to enter the mortgage market. Thus one might expect 
the effect of Regulation 0 ceilings on mortgage lending 
to have declined somewhat over time, as the ,mortgage 
market evolved in response to disintermediation pres- 
sures. This inference is tested by the empirical anal- 
ysis below, which assesses the extent to which the 
effectiveness of Regulation 0 ceilings in  restraining 
mortgage lending during periods  of monetary  strin- 
gency declined over time. 
Partly in recognition of the pressures that periods of 
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institutions to raise funds, the authorities increased the 
minimum denomination of Treasury bills  from $1,000 to 
$10,000 in 1970. Nevertheless, the incentives created 
by high and rising interest rates in the late 1960s and 
1970s spurred the development of alternative deposit- 
like savings  vehicles.  For example,  money  market 
mutual funds (MMMF5) were introduced in 1972, and 
by the late 1970s  they had become serious competitors 
with depository institutions (Chart  3). 
The process of dismantling Regulation 0 ceilings on 
retail deposits began  in June 1978, when depository 
institutions  were  allowed  to issue  six-month  money 
market certificates (MMC5)  in denominations of 
$10,000 or more.2 The MMCs offered interest rates tied 
to those available on Treasury bills. The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
March 1980 stipulated  that Regulation 0 ceilings be 
phased out on time and savings deposits and permitted 
thrifts and banks to offer individuals interest-bearing 
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts, essen- 
tially checking accounts that were not subject to the 
interest prohibition applying to demand deposits. These 
2lnterest  rate ceilings on 
1973. 
Chart 2 
large certificates of  deposit were removed  in 
relaxations of Regulation 0 eased the funding  prob- 
lems during the period  of high nominal interest rates at 
the turn of the decade. 
The Garn-St  Germain  Depository  Institutions  Act, 
passed  in October 1982, further expanded  funding 
alternatives for banks and thrifts.3 The act authorized 
two new types of accounts:  money  market deposit 
accounts (MMDA5)—designed to be competitive with 
MMMFs—and  Super-NOW accounts.  Both accounts 
had minimum balances of $2,500, and both were free 
from interest rate ceilings. MMDAs were permitted 
beginning in December 1982  and Super-NOW  accounts 
in January 1983. By early 1983, these new accounts 
effectively  eliminated  Regulation  Q as a significant 
constraint on banks' and thrifts' ability to raise retail 
funds, although disintermediation pressures had been 
lessening for some months before then as a result of a 
marked reduction in interest rates. 
3For  discussions of the state of  the financial health of  thrifts during 
this period, see, for  example, R. Dan Brumbaugh,  Thrifts Under 
Siege (Cambridge, Mass.:  Ballinger,  1988), chap. 2; and Patrick I. 
Mahoney  and Alice P. White, •'The Thrift Industry in Transition," 
Federal Reserve  Bulletin, March 1985, pp.  137-56.  For details on the 
Garn-St Germain Act and its effects, see Federal Reserve  Bank of 
Chicago Economic Perspectives,  March-April 1983; and Michael C. 
Keeley  and Gary C. Zimmerman,  "Competition for Money  Market 
Deposit Accounts," Federal Reserve  Bank of San Francisco 
Economic Review, Spring 1985, pp. 5-27. 
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Notes: Before  1984, disintermediation pressure is  measured as  the  three-month Treasury bill rate less  the  Regulation 0  ceiling on thrift  passbook 
accounts when  this  difference  is  positive; disintermediation  pressure is  calculated as  zero  when  the difference  is  negative.  From  1984  on, the value 
is zero. The shaded areas  represent  periods when  the  disintermediation spread  is significantly greater  than zero. 
0 Also important in the allocation of  funds for mortgage 
lending  were state-imposed usury ceilings on mortgage 
interest rates. These ceilings differed substantially from 
state to state, and studies of the impact of usury ceil- 
ings have been very limited  in scope. Nevertheless, 
some research indicates that usury ceilings limited the 
flow of funds into mortgage lending.4 
It was argued above that deposit rate ceilings, when 
binding, acted to reduce new mortgage lending more 
sharply in response to an increase in market interest 
rates than would otherwise have occurred. Absent ceil- 
ings on mortgage interest  rates, such a reduction in 
mortgage lending could have sharply raised mortgage 
interest rates, choking off the demand for new mort- 
gages until it matched the smaller  volume of funds 
available.  To  the extent that mortgage interest rate  ceil- 
ings prevented mortgage rates from  increasing suffi- 
ciently to bring demand into line with supply, however, 
lending would have had to be rationed in other ways 
(for example, lower loan-to-value ratios). The  existence 
of usury ceilings, therefore, prevents one from deduc- 
ing whether the change  in mortgage interest rates 
caused  by an increase in market rates would  be 
greater or smaller in the regulated environment than in 
the deregulated  environment. The behavior of mort- 
4For references and a more complete discussion, see Harold C. 
Nathan,  Economic  Analysis of Usury Laws,  Journal of  Bank 
Research,  Winter 1980, pp.  200-211. 
Chart 3 
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gage interest rates in response to a monetary tighten- 
ing is investigated empirically below. 
Growth of securitization 
The secondary mortgage market originated in the 
depression period with the foundation of the  Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934 and the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae or FNMA) 
in 1938. The FHA insured long-term, fixed-rate mort- 
gages, and FNMA was formed to provide a secondary 
market for FHA-insured loans. Government participa- 
tion in the mortgage market was further expanded at 
the end of World War II with the creation of the Vet- 
erans Administration (VA) program. FNMA began pur- 
chasing VA mortgages in 1948. 
The next major institutional development in the sec- 
ondary market occurred in  1968,  when Congress 
restructured FNMA as a government-chartered  private 
corporation and created the Government National 
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae  or  GNMA)  to 
assume some of FNMA's functions. Perhaps the most 
significant development at this time was that GNMA 
was empowered to guarantee, with the "full faith and 
credit" of the U.S. Treasury,  the timely payment of both 
principal and interest on its securities backed by FHA- 
insured or VA-guaranteed  loans. GNMA guaranteed its 
first mortgage-backed  security (MBS) issue in February 
of 1970. Also in 1970, the  Federal Home Loan Mort- 
gage Corporation (Freddie Mac or FHLMC) was char- 
tered to develop the secondary market in conventional 
mortgages (that is, mortgages not guaranteed by the 
FHA or VA).  In the following year, FHLMC issued its 
first MBS backed by conventional mortgages. FNMA, 
however, did not begin issuing MBSs until 1981. 
The first type of MBSs issued were mortgage pass- 
•  through securities. Essentially, these provided an own- 
ership interest in the underlying pool of mortgages that 
•  backed the certificates,  and all payments of interest 
•  and  principal (less a servicing fee) were passed 
through to the holders of the certificates. However, the 
risk of default on  MBSs was substantially lower than 
the risk of default on whole mortgages because of the 
agency guarantees. 
An important product innovation was  launched by 
FHLMC in 1983, when it issued the first collateralized 
mortgage obligation (CMO). A CMO is a multiple-class 
security, each class having a different maturity. The 
early CMO issues were structured so that, as payments 
of principal were received (including prepayments),  the 
shorter maturity tranches were completely retired 
before  any payments of principal  were made to the 
holders of the longer maturity tranches. The attractive- 
ness  of issuing structured MBSs was greatly enhanced 
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which permitted multi- 
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of Funds  data. pie-class securities to be  issued in  the form  of real 
estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs).5 Since 
1986, multiple-class securities have become more com- 
plex in structure, with the introduction of interest-only 
(10) and principal-only  (P0) strips and Planned and 
Targeted  Amortization Classes (PACs and  TACS).° 
Chart 4 illustrates the rapid growth in the securitization 
of the stock of residential mortgages in recent  years. 
The  MBS market encourages a separation of  the var- 
ious functions  of mortgage lending, in particular  the 
separation of the origination  and servicing  functions 
from the decision  to hold mortgages as a portfolio 
investment. This feature in turn permits institutions that 
have a comparative advantage in originating and ser- 
vicing mortgages to expand their activities without the 
need to raise funds to invest long term in these mort- 
gages. As indicated below, this may have been a  signif- 
icant factor in the expansion of mortgage banks' 
activities in originating loans in the 1980s. Furthermore, 
the  ability to invest in mortgages without having to 
originate or service them substantially  increases the 
attractiveness of mortgages as an investment vehicle 
for institutional  investors such as pension funds  and 
fixed income mutual funds. 
The development of structured  securities such as 
CMOs and REMIC5 has also made possible a more 
efficient distribution across investors of the risk associ- 
ated with investing in mortgages. Mortgages are sub- 
ject to prepayment risk. As interest  rates fall,  mort- 
gagors have an incentive to refinance their mortgages, 
prepaying the old mortgages. Consequently, investors 
are  left to reinvest  these  prepayments in  the lower 
interest rate environment, realizing a reduced yield on 
their original investment.  Dividing up the cash flows 
from the underlying mortgages into tranches with differ- 
ent yields and maturities, and therefore different 
degrees of prepayment risk, permits a better matching 
of investor preferences to the  risks inherent in mort- 
gage cash flows and potentially increases the number 
of investors willing to hold some form of mortgage or 
mortgage security in their portfolios. 
Because MBS5 are easily tradable in the secondary 
market, they are much more liquid than mortgages. 
Hence they can be held  as a short-term investment 
'The 1986 Tax Reform Act enabled the issuer of the secinty to sell 
the residual interest  — that is, the difference between the cash flows 
from  the mortgages  and the payments  to the holders of the REM  IC — 
without incurring double taxation on the pass-through  of these 
payments. 
'PACs and TAC5 are REMIC classes whose principal paydown follows 
a set schedule unless the prepayment rate on the underlying 
mortgages moves outside a certain range. For more details, see 
Richard Roll, 'Stripped Mortgage Backed Securities," Goldman 
Sachs, October 1986; and Richard Roll, "Recent Innovations  in 
Collateralized Mortgage  Obligations," Goldman  Sachs, January  1987. 
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vehicle, an advantage which further widens the poten- 
tial investor base for mortgages. By attracting a greater 
pool of investors, MBSs make possible a more efficient 
pricing of prepayment  risks. Furthermore,  because 
MBSs generally have some form of government  or 
agency guarantee, they carry a default risk below that 
of the mortgages that back them. Taken together, these 
arguments strongly  suggest that the development of 
the MBS market should have lowered the interest rate 
spreads between  mortgages and  other long-term 
investments, such as Treasury bonds. The extent to 
which  the expansion of the MBS market may  have 
reduced mortgage spreads is investigated below. 
The MBS market also  helped  to alleviate  funding 
pressures during the period of heavy disintermediation 
in the early 1980s. The secondary market enabled 
thrifts to sell mortgages or MBS5 and to use the pro- 
ceeds to originate new mortgages. Nevertheless, an 
argument can be made that such  effects were probably 
not large. For much of the time when deposit rate ceil- 
ings were in force,  the size of the  MBS market was 
fairly  small relative to the total mortgage market (Chart 
4). Further, since disintermediation occurred at a time 
of rising interest  rates,  many existing  mortgages or 
MBSs were "under water," that is, they had a market 
price less  than the book  value  of the mortgage or 
security. Consequently, selling  underwater mortgages 
or MBSs would have resulted in a loss of stated capital 
at a time when average lending margins were probably 
coming  under pressure  (particularly in the 1981-82 
period).7 
Adjustable rate  mortgages 
Although a few adjustable  rate mortgages8 (ARMs) 
were originated in the 1970s,  widespread issuance of 
ARMs did not begin until the early 1980s. The high 
7lhis disincentive  was sharply reduced for  thrifts by the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board's October 1981 change to thrift accounting 
procedures. These procedures permitted losses on the sale of assets 
with below-market  coupons to be deferred for  accounting purposes 
but realized in the  current year for  tax purposes. For more details, 
see William W. Bartlett. Mortgage-Backed  Securities (New  York:  New 
York Institute of Finance, 1989), pp. 25-27. 
'Most  ARMs include interest rate or payment  caps to limit the interest 
rate risk borne by the borrower. These caps limit the maximum 
amount by which the interest rate or payments  on the mortgage  can 
be adjusted each year. The cap most commonly  set is 2 percentage 
points per year or. over the lifetime of the loan, typically between 
5  and 6 percentage points. Subject to  these caps, the ARM rate is 
tied to an index plus a margin  (such as the one-year  constant 
majurity Treasury  bill rate). In addition, many ARMs have at various 
times carried initial rates substantially below current market levels 
(so-called teaser rates). 
'ARMs are very common in many overseas  countries. For example, in 
the United Kingdom  mortgages are typically twenty-five-year  variable 
rate mortgages; the predominant  form of  mortgage finance in Canada 
is the rollover mortgage, which needs to be refinanced every one to 
five years. and volatile interest rates of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, combined with the gradual phaseout of Regula- 
tion Q, made it increasingly attractive for depository 
institutions to manage their interest rate risk carefully. 
In 1981 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) 
authorized federally chartered thrifts to issue or pur- 
chase ARMs. Impetus was added to the development 
of the ARMs origination market with the introduction of 
FNMA's ARM purchase program in that  year and 
FHLMC's program in the following year. The introduc- 
tion of the FHLBB's new net worth accounting regula- 
tions in October 1981 reduced the disincentive to sell 
existing mortgages and thereby encouraged thrifts to 
restructure their balance sheets to match more closely 
the interest sensitivity of the returns on their assets to 
the interest sensitivity of their liabilities. 
The growth of the ARMs market is illustrated in 
Chart 5, which shows the share of new originations that 
are in the form of ARMs. As the chart illustrates, the 
share of ARMs is closely correlated with the spread 
between the  average interest  rate on new fixed rate 
mortgages and that on new ARMs. 
The introduction of the ARM has helped broaden the 
spectrum of financial  instruments, bringing potential 
benefits to both borrowers and lenders. From the bor- 
rower's perspective, an ARM is attractive because it 
usually carries  a lower interest cost than a fixed rate 
Chart  4 
mortgage, although that rate may increase later in the 
life of the loan. This lower interest rate  reflects the cus- 
tomary upward slope of the Treasury yield curve, the 
transfer of some of the interest rate risk from the 
lender to the borrower, and the pricing of the prepay- 
ment option in the fixed rate mortgage. The availability 
of ARMs  has  allowed  some borrowers  who cannot 
qualify at the higher fixed interest rate to obtain a mort- 
gage, although they must be willing to bear  the interest 
rate  risk.10 Consequently, ARMs may have increased 
the demand for housing at a given level of mortgage 
interest rates. At the same time, however, the demand 
for housing may have become more sensitive to mort- 
gage interest rate changes as a result of the introduc- 
tion of ARMs.  This greater sensitivity could açise 
because some potential ARMs borrowers may be on 
the margin of qualifying for an ARM.11 Still, one would 
10This mortgage qualification effect might have been more pronounced 
at times when ARMs carried initial teaser rates. Nevertheless.  John L. 
Goodman,  Jr., and Stuart A. Gabriel ("Forecasting  Housing 
Construction: Lessons  and Puzzles from Recent Years," Federal 
Reserve  Board, Working Paper no. 69. January 1987)  present 
evidence to suggest that the effects of qualifying at  these leaser 
rates may not have been large. They note, for example,  that stricter 
qualification guidelines for ARMs were introduced in 1984. 
"Evidence suggests that many ARM debtors have relatively few liquid 
assets and that their cash  flows are vulnerable to being squeezed by 
rising interest rates. Such evidence is consistent with the view that 
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relative to the reduced sensitivity stemming from the 
phaseout of Regulation 0. 
It may be misleading, however,  to consider only the 
demand effect of ARMS when evaluating the potential 
impact of this type of mortgage on housing activity. 
From the lender's perspective, issuing ARMs provides 
a way of reducing the exposure of its balance sheet to 
varying interest rates by passing on some of the inter- 
est rate risk to borrowers, albeit at the risk of raising 
the default rate on its loan portfolio. If deposit dereg- 
ulation had occurred without the parallel development 
of the ARMs market, it is conceivable that deposit inter- 
mediaries, some of whom experienced negative 
spreads between the average effective interest  rate 
they  received  on their mortgage portfolios and the 
average rate of interest paid on deposits in 1981 and 
1982, might have been less willing to bid for deposits 
and originate fixed rate mortgages in the newly deregu- 
Footnote  11 continued 
prospective ARMs borrowers  may be more financially constrained 
than other mortgagors.  See John L. Goodman,  Jr., Charles A. 
Luckett, and David W. Wilcox, "Interest Rates and Household  Cash 
Flow." Board of  Governors  of the Federal Reserve  System,  December 
1988. 
lated environment. Such an outcome in turn  might have 
limited the available supply of mortgage  finance unless 
other lenders were willing to bear the risk,  If the 
absence of ARMs had reduced the supply of mortgage 
lending, then either mortgage rates would  have been 
higher than was observed, reflecting the greater scar- 
city of mortgage funds,  or mortgage  lending would 
have been restricted in some other way. Therefore, 
studies showing that investment in housing during the 
period 1982-84 can be explained by the level of fixed 
mortgage rates and concluding on this basis that the 
introduction of ARMs had little or no impact on housing 
activity12 leave open the question whether the introduc- 
tion of ARMS lowered fixed  mortgage rates below what 
they would have been otherwise. 
Many analyses of the  impact of ARMs on housing 
demand find some theoretical support for the argument 
that the availability of ARMs increases the demand for 
housing.  Nevertheless, such effects might be small; 
laThese  studies include Howard  Esaki and Judy Wachtenheim, 
"Explaining the Recent Level of Single-Family  Housing  Starts," 
Federal Reserve  Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Winter 1984-85, 
pp. 31-38; and Michael J. Stutzer and William Roberds,  "Adjustable- 
Rate Mortgages: Increasing Efficiency  More than Housing Activity," 
Federal Reserve  Bank of  Minneapolis Quarterly  Review, Summer 
1985, pp. 10-20. 
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Chart  5 
Share of  Adjustable  Rate Mortgages (ARMS) and  Spread between Fixed  Rate Mortgages and  ARMS 
Source: Department of  the  Treasury, Office  of  Thrift Supervision. there is little empirical evidence to suggest otherwise. 
Since ARMs have only been available for a limited time 
and their introduction coincided with other innovations 
in the mortgage market, the evidence on the impact of 
ARMs is tentative and the subject merits further inves- 
tigation as more data accumulate. 
Increasing competition in the mortgage market 
The market for mortgage originations  became much 
more competitive in the 1980s. With the phasing out of 
Regulation  Q ceilings, thrifts could compete with one 
another for deposits by raising their interest rates. Fur- 
thermore, a number of thrifts attempted to grow quickly, 
in part by originating new mortgages.13 
Competitive pressure also was growing from  outside 
the industry, particularly  from the mortgage banking 
industry. Table 1  shows the share of mortgage origina- 
tions by four broad sectors and clearly illustrates the 
rise in the share of the mortgage banking industry in 
the 1980s at the expense of the thrifts. This larger role 
for the mortgage banks  —  which specialize in originat- 
ing loans complying with the requirements for sale or 
conversion to MBS5 issued  by FNMA or FHLMC— 
cameat the same time as these agencies were mark- 
edly expanding their role in the secondary  mortgage 
market. According to one analyst, Patric Hendershott, 
the securitized share of new conventional fixed rate 
loans conforming to FHLMC and FNMA standards rose 
from 4 percent in the late 1970s to more than 50 per- 
cent by the middle of the 1980s.14 Hendershott argues 
that this expansion has narrowed the spreads on mort- 
'3For  a  discussion of this development, see,  for example,  Andrew  S. 
Carron,  "The Thrift Industry  Crisis of the 1980s: What  Went Wrong?" 
in The  Future of  the Thrift Industry, Federal Home Loan Bank of San 
Francisco,  December 1988; and Jack M. Guttentag, "Recent 
Changes  in the Primary  Mortgage Market"  Housing Finance Review, 
July 1984, pp. 221-54. 
'4Patric H. Hendershott,  "The Future  of Thrifts as Home Portfolio 
Lenders,"  in The Future of  the Thrift Industry. 
Table  1 
Share of  ,Mortgage Originations 
•by Financial  Institutions 
.  Commercial Mortgage 
Date  Banks  Banks  Thrifts  Other 
1971 to 1975  22.9  19.9  52.5  4.6 
1976 to 1980  21.7  18.1  56.1  4.1 
1981 to 1985  22.5  25.6  47.1  4.7 
1986 to 1988  25.8  25.5  47.1  1.7 
Source: Department  of Housing and Urban Development. 
gage rates relative to long-term bonds. Evidence of the 
potential  impact of these developments on  mortgage 
rates is presented in the next section. 
A model of single-family housing investment 
This section develops a statistical model of single-fam- 
ily housing investment and mortgage interest rates to 
investigate the changing relationship between residen- 
tial investment and interest rates.15 The  section opens 
with a brief summary of the "stylized facts" and open 
questions that can be drawn from previous empirical 
research. The presentation of the model follows, end- 
ing with a brief illustration of the model's ability to track 
historical variations in housing investment. Finally, the 
effects of a tightening of monetary policy in different 
subperiods are simulated in order to assess the chang- 
ing responsiveness of housing investment to changes 
in interest rates. 
Previous work 
Although researchers who have examined the deter- 
mination  of residential investment  have sometimes 
reached diverse conclusions,  one might summarize 
their findings as follows:16 
(i) housing activity  was influenced by disintermedia- 
tion pressures fostered by Regulation Q ceilings, 
although there  is no consensus on the overall 
strength of this effect; 
(ii)  the effects of disintermediation  were markedly 
reduced by the late 1970s,  and  in  the period 
1978-82 it is not, clear that this process signifi- 
cantly reduced housing activity; 
(iii)  apart from the effects of deposit disintermedia- 
tion, there is no evidence that housing investment 
was less responsive to interest rates in the 1980s 
than in either the 1970s or 1960s; 
15A more detailed discussion of the derivation of the relationships 
presented here can be found in John Ryding. "Housing Finance and 
the Transmission  Mechanism  of Monetary Policy," in Studies on 
Financial Changes and the Transmission  of  Monetary  Policy.  Federal 
Reserve  Bank of New York. May 1990. 
laWork on modeling residential investment  includes: Dwight M. Jaffee 
and Kenneth  T. Rosen, "Mortgage Credit Availability  and Residential 
Construction," Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1979. 
pp. 333-76; Esaki and Wachtenheim,  Explaining  the Recent Level of 
Single-Family  Housing Starts"; M. A. Akhtar and  Ethan S. Harris. 
"Monetary Policy Influence  on the Economy —  An Empirical Analysis," 
Federal Reserve  Bank of  New York Quarterly Review. Winter 1986-87, 
pp. 19-34; Adrian Throop, 'Financial Deregulation,  Interest Rates, and 
the Housing Cycle," Federal Reserve  Bank of San Francisco 
Economic  Review, Summer  1986, pp.  63-78; George A, Kahn, 'The 
Changing Interest Sensitivity of  the U.S. Economy,"  Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City  Economic Review, November  1989. pp. 13-34; 
and Randall J, Pozdena.  "Do Interest Rates  Still Affect Housing?" 
Federal Reserve  Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, Summer 
1990, pp. 3-14. These papers, with the  exception of that by Pozdena, 
are briefly critiqued in Ryding, "Housing Finance and the 
Transmission  Mechanism." 
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short sample period, financial innovations such 
as securitization and ARMs have not been found 
to have a noticeable impact on housing activity.17 
The model developed here makes it possible to reex- 
amine these assertions. 
Structure and testing of the model 
The  general structure of  the model can be explained in 
simple terms. At its core are two equations,  'one deter- 
mining mortgage interest rates and the other housing 
investment.  The first  equation  relates the average 
effective mortgage rate on all loans closed (both fixed 
and adjustable) to Treasury  rates,  with the spread 
between these rates depending on a number of vari- 
ables, as explained below. The  second equation relates 
new single-family housing investment—the measure of 
housing investment used in this study — to real 
incomes and mortgage interest rates; in this equation 
disintermediation pressures  affect the cyclical 
response of housing to interest rates. Since the model 
is estimated on quarterly data, time series econometric 
methods, outlined in the Box, are  used to determine 
the time profile of the response of one variable (say, 
housing investment) to another (say, mortgage rates). 
Let us examine the individual equations in more detail. 
The mortgage rate relationship begins with a long- 
run relationship linking the mortgage rate and the vari- 
ables that it may depend on (Table 2, column 1). The 
selection of variables was guided  by the research of 
other economists  and the arguments put forward  in 
earlier sections of this article. The  most significant vari- 
able (judged by the t-statistics given in parentheses)18 
is the average level of market interest rates, which is a 
weighted  average of the ten-year  constant  maturity 
Treasury rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate, 
where the weights depend on the share  of ARMs in 
new loans closed. As one might expect, this variable 
has a coefficient close to one, suggesting that a  1  per- 
centage point rise in  market rates would  eventually 
lead to a  1  percentage point  rise  in mortgage rates. 
Since this coefficient is virtually one, all other  variables 
can be thought of as explaining the spread on mart- 
'7But Barry Bosworth,  tn "Institutional Change and the Efficacy of 
Monetary  Policy  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity 1:1989, 
pp. 77-110, uses evidence on Canadian housing investment  to argue 
that ARMs have reduced the interest sensitivity of housing in the 
United States. Alan Blinder and David Romer, in the same  volume, 
cast some doubt on his interpretation of  the results, arguing that the 
most significant change to the transmission  mechanism has come 
from the elimination  of disintermediation. 
1lt  should be noted, however,  that the standard errors and hence 
t-values from this equation are biased. See James H. Stock, 
"Asymptotic  Properties  of Least Squares  Estimators  of Coinlegrating 
Vectors." Econometrica,  1987, pp. 1035-56. 
Box: Explanation  of Econometric  Techniques 
The estimation techniques used  in this article follow 
much recent work in time series  econometrics. The 
equation for mortgage interest rates is derived using 
the  Engle-Granger two-step  method of cointegration 
modeling.t This approach involves estimating a first- 
stage regression between the level of the variable to be 
explained and other variables on which long-run move- 
ments in this variable are thought to depend. Testing 
whether the variables are cointegrated is done using 
the Dickey-Fuller test. For example, if V is thought to 
depend on X and Z, the first-stage regression is: 
(1) 
If the Dickey-Fuller  test suggests that  u1 is generated by 
a stationary process, the estimated residuals, O, from 
this  equation are used as an error  correction variable in 
a dynamic regression of the general form: 
(2)  =  X1 +  + :kYt.R +  yCt11 + st. 
The selection of  the lag lengths I, J, and K depends on 
the statistical significance of the variables and on 
whether c appears to be serially uncorrelated (using 
the Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlationl)  and 
to have a constant variance (using the  test for auto- 
regressive  conditional heteroscedasticity,  or ARCH, 
errors). 
The other equations in the article are modeled using 
a general-to-specific  modeling strategy.t Illustrating this 
strategy with our three-variable example, we have a 
general model of the form: 
(3)  Vt = Po +  X + E&,Z.j + '(k't-k + 
where the maximum lag lengths I, J, and K are chosen 
on the basis of the  properties of the residuals.  The 
equation can then be restricted in various ways, using 
F- or t-tests to assess the validity of the restrictions. 
tSee Robert F, Engle and C.W.J. Granger,  "Co-integration and 
Error Correction: Representation,  Estimation,  and Testing," 
Economefrica,  March 1987. pp. 251-76. 
See  Trevor S. Breusch,  "Testing for Autocorrelation  in Dynamic 
Linear Models," Australian  Economic  Papers. 1978. pp.  334-55. 
§See Robert F. Engle, "Autoregressive  Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity  with Estimates of the Variance of U.K. 
Inflation," Econometrica,  1982. pp.  987-1007. 
IlFor  more details see, for  example, David F, Hendry. Adrian A. 
Pagan, and J, Denis Sargan, "Dynamic Specification," in Zvi 
Griliches ahd Michael D, Intriligator. eds,, Handbook of 
Econometrics  (Amsterdam:  North Holland,  1983), 
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gage interest rates over Treasury rates. Two possible 
determinants of the spread that were discussed earlier 
are the growth of the MBS market and the operation of 
usury ceilings. The coefficient on the MBS term sug- 
gests that for each percent of the mortgage stock that 
has been securitized, the spread on mortgages over 
Treasury rates has fallen by 3.5 basis points, although 
considerable statistical  uncertainty is attached to this 
estimate. The proxy variable for the operation of usury 
ceilings (measured by the level of Treasury bond rates 
before the abolition of usury ceilings and zero there- 
after) suggests that, on average, a rise of 100 basis 
points  in interest rates when usury ceilings were in 
effect would lead to a decline of about 4 basis points in 
the spread on mortgages.19 The spread on mortgages 
is also modeled as depending on the spread of AAA 
corporate  bonds over Treasuries. One might  expect 
these spreads to be correlated for two reasons. First, 
because the  spread on corporate bonds over Treas- 
uries tends to widen when the economy turns down, it 
may act as a proxy for the risk of default on mortgages, 
a risk which is related to the cyclical state of the econ- 
omy. Second, many corporate bonds are callable,  a 
feature that is similar to the prepayment option embed- 
ded in a mortgage, and this spread might therefore be 
correlated with the incentives to prepay. The  coefficient 
on this variable suggests that, on  average, when the 
spread on corporate bonds  widened  by 100  basis 
points,  the mortgage spread widened by around  80 
basis points. Although this equation explains the trend 
movements in mortgage.rates, it does not explain the 
shorter  run  movements closely. The statistical tech- 
nique used to track  short-term  rate  movements 
regresses the change in mortgage interest rates on the 
deviation of mortgage rates from their trend level, as 
determined by the previous equation, and on changes 
(current and lagged) of various interest rates (Table 2, 
column 2). 
Housing investment in the model is measured by a 
proxy for the growth in the stock of single-family hous- 
ing. Like equations for housing investment obtained by 
many other researchers,  this equation is derived from a 
stock adjustment equation that links  the demand for the 
stock of housing  to real  incomes and  real  post-tax 
mortgage interest rates.2°  Hence, one would expect the 
1PreferabIy,  one would want some measure  of the average  usury 
ceiling across the country and would only include this term when 
market rates exceeded this ceiling. Such data are not available, 
however,  and therefore this effect has to be considered fairly 
tentative. 
20Some researchers  have used a user cost rather than a post-tax real 
interest rate. The only essential difference between the two measures 
is  that the latter measure adjusts the real post-tax rate for  the 
movement  in house prices relative to other prices. 
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scedasticity  0.64 
Note: Figures in parentheses  are t-values. 
tAverage effective rate on all conventional  home mortgages 
closed. 
tThe average of the interest rate on three-month  Treasury  bills 
and ten-year Treasury  bonds. The bill rate is given the weight 
of  ARMs in new mortgages closed (0 before 1982). 
§The long-run level of mortgage rates is given by  the predicted 
value from the regression reported in column 1 of this table. Housing  investment 
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est rate  variables include the level of the real mortgage 
interest rate and the change in a nominal interest rate, 
the latter variable perhaps reflecting a short-term cash 
flow effect.21 To capture the effects of disintermediation 
in the housing equation, the spread (when positive) 
between the three-month  Treasury bill rate and the 
Regulation 0  ceiling on savings accounts at thrifts was 
included. To examine the possibility that the effective- 
ness of these ceilings in restraining mortgage growth 
was declining over time, the coefficient on the disinter- 
mediation variable was allowed to differ in each of the 
historical  periods when Treasury bill rates exceeded 
the ceiling. The declining values of these coefficients 
211n the specification search for the housing investment  equation, both 
real and nominal  mortgage rates (current and lagged several 
quarters) were included as explanatory  variables. Statistical tests 
rejected the hypothesis that the real interest rate should enter in 
difference form only. 
stock of housing to grow as real incomes rise or real 
mortgage rates fall. Movements in housing investment 
have been very cyclical, however, and modeling these 
movements requires a statistical approach that allows 
for complex lag structures between housing investment 
and mortgage rates, real incomes, and disintermedia- 
tion pressures. 
The housing investment equation relates the growth 
in the stock of single-family housing to the growth in 
real personal disposable income and a number of vari- 
ables designed  to capture the effects of mortgage 
interest rates and disintermediation (Table  3). The inter- 
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Note: Figures  in parentheses  are t-values. 
— .  ...  ——  —— suggest that such a change was in fact taking place, a 
finding discussed further  below. Note that the statis- 
tically significant coefficient on this term for the period 
1978-82 provides evidence that disintermediation con- 
tinued to play an  important role in the contraction of 
housing investment during that period, even after the 
introduction of MMC5. 
A number of different  specifications of the housing 
equation were  examined,  and  some  of the results 
obtained are worth noting. For example, there was no 
evidence that housing investment has become signifi- 
cantly more or less sensitive to movements  in the aver- 
age level of mortgage interest rates.  However, the 
widespread use of ARMs opens up the possibility of 
some additional short-run sensitivity to market interest 
rates, since  an  increase in the federal funds rate is 
typically associated, at least initially, with a sharper 
rise in short-term interest rates than in long-term inter- 
est rates. Consequently,  the ARMs rate will rise more 
quickly than the interest rate on fixed rate mortgages 
during the initial phase of a monetary tightening. The 
size of this  potential additional sensitivity to interest 
rates, however, is extremely small relative to the reduc- 
tion in sensitivity arising from the elimination of disin- 
termediation.  Furthermore, even though the average 
level of mortgage rates may be more responsive, in the 
short run, to market interest rates, there is no strong 
evidence that this will affect housing investment. 
Indeed, when the housing equation was reestimated 
using the interest rate on fixed rate mortgages alone 
(rather than the weighted average interest rate), results 
virtually identical with those presented in Table 3 were 
obtained. Furthermore, specifications that included the 
rate  on fixed rate  mortgages typically  showed no signif- 
icant  separate role for the interest rate on ARMs. 
To examine the response of housing investment to a 
tightening in monetary policy, the model includes equa- 
tions that link the three-month Treasury bill and ten- 
year constant maturity Treasury interest rates to the 
federal funds rate. These equations,  presented  in 
Table 4, capture the average historical response  of 
these Treasury rates to movements  in the federal funds 
rate.  For example, the equations suggest that a 100 
basis point rise in the funds rate sustained for one year 
would raise the three-month Treasury bill rate  about 75 
basis points by the end of that period, and the yield on 
ten-year Treasury bonds about 50 basis points. 
The ability of a model to track historical  develop- 
ments is one  indicator of that model's usefulness. 
Chart  6 compares the predicted values for quarterly 
Chart  6 
HousIng Investment:  HIstorIc DynamIc TrackIng 
Percent 
1.2 
One- to  Four-Family  Housing Stock 
Sources:  Federal Reserve  Board and model  simulation. 
FRBNY Quarterly Review/Summer  1990  53 
Actual 
'I 
03h iii  ii iii  iii  I lllIl111IllI1ll1l111lI  1111111111111111111  I I iii  111111111 III iii liii  I  liii  I 
1965  67  69  71  73  75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89 housing investment from 1965 to 1988 with the actual 
values derived from the complete model. The model is 
solved dynamically, that is, one period's  solution for 
investment or interest rates feeds into that for the next 
period and provides a strong indication of model ade- 
quacy.  As the chart suggests, the model appears to 
follow historical movements in housing investment rea- 
sonably closely. 
Response of housing activity  to monetary policy 
This subsection  uses the model presented above to 
consider the partial response of housing to a monetary 
policy tightening. The response is partial in the sense 
that  consumer prices and real  incomes are  held 
unchanged in the simulation. However,  since we  are 
interested in the direct response of housing investment 
to monetary tightening, this approach  would  seem 
appropriate. 
Two experiments were constructed  to examine the 
changing response of housing expenditures to a tight- 
ening of policy. The first examined the response of the 
model to a permanent increase in the federal funds 
rate of 1  percentage point. Four simulations were car- 
ried out. The first raised the funds rate alone, with no 
disintermediation  effects.  This simulation  is  labeled 
"the late 1980s" in Chart 7. In each of the other  three 
Chart  7 
Housing investment:  Response to  a Permanent 
Monetary Tightening 
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simulations, one of the disintermediation spreads was 
allowed to respond by the increase in the three-month 
Treasury bill rate (at its peak, this response was about 
four-fifths of the movement in the funds rate). The chart 
shows that after three years housing investment would 
be depressed by over 15 percent if the response were 
similar to that observed in monetary contractions of the 
late 1960s or mid-1970s (although the effects of disin- 
termediation appeared to take a little longer to pass 
through  in the mid-1970s). However, if the response 
were like that exhibited between 1978 and 1982, hous- 
ing activity would be much less depressed, falling  by 
only about  6 percent.  Without  disintermediation, the 
response of housing investment is much  smaller 
(around 2 percent), as shown by the "late 1980s" line. 
This last result suggests that, contrary to the findings 
of Throop, much of  the response of housing investment 
in the 1960s and 1970s to periods of monetary tighten- 
ing was due to the effects of disintermediation (since 
the model indicates that without disintermediation, 
The  disintermediation  variable for  1966-67 was not shocked because 
this period of credit rationing  was very short and generated very 
large effects on mortgage lending and housing  activity. The strength 
of these effects may have reflected, to a large extent, the fact that 
Regulation 0  ceilings had only just been extended to thrifts and 
were biting for  the first time. 
Chart  8 
Housing Investment:  Response to  a  Temporary 
Monetary Tightening 
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throughout the simulation period. housing investment would have responded rather  like 
the late 1980s line to a monetary tightening), and not 
due to the interest sensitivity of housing investment  per 
se. This finding accords much more with the results 
obtained by Benjamin Friedman23  in simulations car- 
ried out on the Federal Reserve Board's model. 
It can be argued that the above experiment is some- 
what artificial  in assuming such a prolonged period of 
tightening without  any response of real growth or infla- 
tion.  For this reason, a second experiment was con- 
ducted in which the funds rate was raised for only one 
year. The results, presented in Chart 8, echo the gen- 
eral findings from the first experiment. 
On the basis of these experiments,  one can conclude 
the following: 
(i) the responsiveness of housing investment to a 
tightening in monetary policy, now that Regula- 
tion Q ceilings are no longer in effect, is  signifi- 
cantly smaller than  in the 1960s  or 1970s, 
notwithstanding the direct effects of short-term 
rates on ARMs; 
(ii) the effectiveness of Regulation  Q ceilings in 
restraining  mortgage lending during periods  of 
monetary tightening apparently diminished over 
time; 
(iii) although the response of housing investment was 
less than  previous experience might  have sug- 
gested, Regulation 0 ceilings and disintermedia- 
tion  played an important role in  the 1978-82 
contraction; 
(iv) the effects of a given increase in interest rates on 
housing investment would be rather smaller now 
than in 1978-82. 
The first two conclusions are generally in  agreement 
with existing work. What had not been established in 
earlier  research, however, is that the process of deposit 
rate disintermediation resulting from the operation of 
Regulation 0 ceilings appears to  have  played  an 
23Benjamin  M. Friedman,  Effects of Monetary Policy on Real  Economic 
Activity,'  in Monetary Policy Issues in the 1990s, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, 1989. 
important role in the contraction of housing investment 
in the period between 1978 and 1982. 
From the macroeconomic  perspective adopted in the 
statistical part of this study, there is not much evidence 
that developments in housing finance other than the 
elimination of Regulation Q ceilings have had a sub- 
stantial  impact on the relationship  between housing 
investment and monetary policy. One development, the 
growth in the securitization of the stock of mortgage 
debt, appears to have had the effect of decreasing the 
spreads between mortgages and other interest rates. 
But although lower mortgage spreads may make hous- 
ing more affordable  over  time,  the  smaller  spreads 
themselves do not  imply an  additional change in the 
response of mortgage rates to a rise in other interest 
rates. Hence the growth  in  securitization appears to 
have had little effect on how housing investment has 
responded to a tightening in policy. 
Conclusion 
There have been tremendous innovations in the hous- 
ing finance market, driven partly by the interaction of 
the inflationary environment of the late 1970s with the 
system of regulating deposit rates and partly by federal 
attempts to promote housing finance  with  initiatives 
such as the development of the secondary mortgage 
market. In analyzing the impact of these innovations, 
this article  confirmed  the findings of previous 
researchers that housing demand should now be con- 
siderably less responsive to monetary tightening than 
in the past. Model simulations showed that deposit dis- 
intermediation, induced when market interest rates 
exceeded Regulation 0 ceilings, was the major driving 
force of the contractions in housing activity in 1966-67, 
1969-71, 1974-75, and to a lesser extent, 1978-82.  The 
process of deposit rate deregulation  has, therefore, 
increased the role that mortgage interest rates play in 
allocating mortgage finance and has eliminated bouts 
of rationing. In addition, this article  provides some evi- 
dence  that the growth  of securitization may  have 
reduced mortgage interest rates relative to other inter- 
est rates. 
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